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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE 
 
Two Authors Restate 
     An Incontrovertible 
     Caution.  Why a Book? 
 
      by: Richard Lempert 
 
 
The Caution 
 The authors are: Stephen T. Ziliak and Deirdre N. McCloskey.  Their book is: THE 
CULT OF STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE  How the Standard Error Costs Us Jobs, Justice 
and Lives.1   The caution:  Statistical significance is not the same as substantive significance.  
Statistically significant relationships may, and often do, tell us nothing that matters, while 
relationships that do not achieve conventional levels of statistical significance can be 
important, and we may neglect them at our peril.   
 There is nothing new or controversial about this caution.  Ziliak and McCloskey name 
many scholars, more than 100 I would guess, who have said as much.  Moreover, alerts of 
this sort may be found  in numerous statistical texts and on the pages of journals in many 
fields, including law, sociology, economics, political science, psychology, medicine, public 
health, and epidemiology.  So why do the authors -- who in a number of published articles 
have made a point of making this point -- feel compelled to write a book that reiterates what 
                                                 
1 University of Michigan Press (2008) 
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they have several times said and what anyone who has taken an elementary course in 
statistics should know?  Much of their book seeks to answer this question.2 
 
Evidence of a Problem 
 Their short answer is that even if everyone who studies statistics should have heard 
the message, “Significance (statistical) ≠  Significance (substantive),”  the matter is so 
skimpily treated in most statistical tests, if it is treated at all, that many who study statistics 
do not get the message, and among those who do understand it, many neglect what they have 
learned in reporting research results.  Moreover, editors of and reviewers for even the most 
prestigious journals routinely give a pass to articles that emphasize statistical significance 
over the strength of relationships, thus subordinating issues of practical and theoretical 
importance to the question of whether it is safe to say that relationships reliably exist.3  As 
troublesome, if not more so, authors, editors and reviewers typically accept without question 
the dismissal of a relationship if the association between variables does not reach some 
conventional level of statistical significance -- .05, for example.  Indeed these gatekeepers 
                                                 
2 About a quarter of the text, from p.187 through p. 244, is something else.  It is a fascinating history of the relations, 
contributions and views of many those who pioneered the development of statistical science, most of whose names 
linger on because of tests associated with them.   (e.g.  Karl Pearson, Egon Pearson, William Gosset (“Student”), 
Jerzey Neyman, Ronald Fisher, Harold Hotelling and G. Udny Yule.)  Much of this is a partisan discussion of the 
relationship between, and relative contributions, of Fisher and Gosset, with Fisher being the villain not just in his 
relationship with his friend Gosset but also of the entire story Ziliak and McCloskey tell.  Gosset is characterized as 
“the bee” because of his concern with the weight that ought to be accorded statistical results (think beta weights or 
“b”s in a regression) and Fisher is designated the wasp because of his apparently waspish personality.  For me this 
historical discussion with its focus on personalities, contributions and relationships was the most interesting portion 
of the book, not just because of the inherent interest of even pallid celebrity gossip but also because much in this 
portion was new to me.  However, bearing in mind the authors’ admonition that in examining data we should focus 
on what matters most, I shall only reference these matters briefly in the remainder of this review. 
3 Ziliak and McCloskey know full well that a relationship, no matter how significant statistically, may be illusory, 
for with better data or a more adequately specified model an apparent relationship may disappear.   But to better 
highlight the contrast between too prevalent practice and how they think statistical results should be presented they 
often assume significance tests tell us whether  relationships exist and argue that rather than focusing on the 
“whether” question we should attend to how much a relationship is likely to matter to economic, health or other 
values. 
4 
 
2
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 86 [2008]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art86
sometimes insist that if a relationship is not significant, its non-existence is the only 
permissible conclusion. 
 The centerpiece of the authors’ attempt to establish the need for their book is a 
summary of two previously published studies that examined articles published in the 1980s 
and 1990s in the American Economics Review (AER).4    The AER is academic economics 
most prestigious journal, economics is the most quantitatively oriented of the social sciences, 
and academic economists are, on average, the social sciences’ most “sophisticated” users of 
mathematics and statistics.   Indeed, the most mathematically able graduate students in fields 
like sociology and political science are often advised to take the graduate econometrics 
sequence rather than their own field’s statistical offerings.   Thus, if there are any social 
scientists who should understand the difference between statistical and substantive 
significance and who should know that if the goal is to make sense of what is going on it is 
substantive significance that matters, it should be those economists who publish in their 
field’s most prestigious journal. 
 Economists may do better than others in these respects.  Without comparative data, 
which Ziliak and McCloskey do not provide, we cannot tell.  But it is clear that Ziliak and 
McCloskey think that by their criteria serious problems exist.  Not only did McCloskey and 
Ziliak find that in the 1980s economists publishing in the AER were often naïve, misguided 
                                                 
4 The author’s intent was to examine all AER articles in the 1980s and 1990s.  However, in their study of AER 
articles published in the 1990s Ziliak and McCloskey overlooked a not insubstantial portion of what had appeared. 
They checked the omitted articles after learning of their mistake, and report in this book that including them changes 
nothing that matters. 
5 
 
3
Lempert:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2008
or mistaken in their reliance on significance tests5, but their article showing this, although it 
received considerable attention, seemed to have little practical impact.   
 Assessing articles with the aid of a checklist of best practices, McCloskey and Ziliak 
found, among other failings, that only 4.4% of 182 articles that appeared in the 1980s 
reported on the power of the tests they were using,6 only about 30% considered more than 
statistical significance decisive in constructing an argument or distinguished between 
statistical and economic significance, and 20% did not discuss the size of their regression 
coefficients.  In the articles published in the1990s, some coded errors were less frequent, 
while others were more common; overall the picture was pretty much unchanged.7 
 These conclusions depend, however, on accepting Ziliak and McClosky’s judgment 
as to whether errors have been made, and I would be surprised if the check list they used 
does not substantially overstate the degree to which what they found or didn’t find was 
problematic.8 .  In addition, the authors define as error choices that are not always 
erroneous.9  Finally, I also question whether Ziliak and McCloskey were being fair to those 
                                                 
5 The Cult p. 75 reproducing a table from Dierdre McCloskey and Stephen T. Ziliak, (1996) The Standard Error of 
Regressions, Journal of Economic Literature,  34 (March) 97-114  
6 Statistical significance, loosely speaking, gives the probability that an association as great or greater than the one 
found in the data would arise by chance.  Hence, if one is testing a “null” or “no difference” hypothesis, it is the 
likelihood that one is mistakenly claiming a relationship exists in the data when an association is pure coincidence.  
The power of a test speaks to the likelihood of making the opposite mistake; that is, claiming there is no relationship 
between two variables beyond that attributable to chance when there is in fact a true (non-chance) relationship.   
7 The Cult  p. 81, reproducing a table from Stephen T. Ziliak and Dierdre McCloskey (2004) Size Matters: The 
Standard Error of Regressions in the American Economics Review, Journal of Socio-Economics 33 (5) 527-46 
8 For example, depending on sample size and results it is often not necessary to report explicitly on the power of 
tests either because adequate power is obvious or because key null hypotheses are rejected.  Yet the proportion of 
articles that they list as attending to power issues seems to have as a denominator all the AER articles in their sample 
9 For example, they disparage what they call “sign econometrics,” that is noting the sign but not the size of 
coefficients.  Yet if signs do not carry the analysis but are used as a check on the plausibility of a model, it may be 
good practice to discuss them.  Consider a study reporting deterrent effects of executions and including control 
variables, like arrest rates and unemployment levels that are thought to relate directly to homicide rates and certainly 
should not diminish them.  If these and similar variables are insignificant but their signs are unexpectedly negative, 
there is reason to suspect the study’s data or the model specification and to be cautious about accepting any findings 
regarding the deterrent effect of executions.   Unexpected directionality, even if not significantly different from zero, 
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whose work10 they reviewed when they faulted 73% of the 1990s articles where the issue 
arose and 32% of the 1980s articles for choosing variables to include in regressions solely on 
the basis of statistical significance.11Those acquainted with articles specifically criticized 
could, no doubt, offer further objections. 
 These complaints are, however, mere quibbles.  Whether or not one accepts Ziliak 
and McCloskey’s scores and scorecard as presented, they are almost certainly correct that 
even in the academic world’s most prestigious economics journal numerous articles rely too 
heavily on statistical significance and pay too little attention to economic significance.  
Focusing more on statistical than substantive significance not only leads readers to infer that 
variables that matter little are in fact important, but it can also lead readers to ignore the 
likely consequential impact of variables that are not significant at conventionally acceptable 
levels.  Ziliak and McCloskey drive this point home in a chapter discussing several clinical 
trials that dismissed helpful drugs as ineffective because the low power of the trial designs 
meant that conventional levels of statistical significance were not attained; I will say more 
about this example later in the essay. 
                                                                                                                                                             
should not be ignored.  I would be surprised if Ziliak and McCloskey, who make their sympathies with Bayesian 
approaches clear throughout, think otherwise. 
 
10 Ziliak and McCloskey do not just identify the prevalence of what they consider error in the aggregate but they 
identify by names those authors from the 1990s who score well or poorly on their checklist. The Cult, pp 90-91.  I 
think their willingness to provide names adds value to their presentation, but it does make fairness to the authors 
whose work they criticize of considerable importance. 
11 There are good reasons for wanting to pare a regression model following a pre-test, exploratory or other 
preliminary analysis, including a desire to preserve degrees of freedom or to simplify output so as to better 
communicate findings.  If there are no strong theoretical reasons to expect a variable to have a particular effect, if 
the variable’s omission has little effect on the overall explained variance or on the coefficients on the remaining 
variables, and if it is statistically insignificant, it is a good candidate for omission.  Omitting variables for these 
reasons is, of course, not to omit them solely on the basis of statistical significance, but a researcher who has 
carefully considered the status of a variable may nevertheless mention only statistical insignificance in justifying the 
omission, perhaps assuming that his readers will take his or her care in deciding on variables to exclude for granted.  
(Ziliak and McCloskey’s criteria speak in terms of including variables solely on the basis of their statistical 
significance, but their discussion of what this means in practice indicates that they are thinking more of dropping 
variables on this basis. ) 
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 Overreliance on statistical significance is a concern not just because it leads to the 
acceptance of substantively unimportant results or to the dismissal of real effects because 
some arbitrary threshold of significance is not reached.  It also means that information on 
what data show is not effectively communicated.  As Ziliak and McCloskey repeatedly 
remind us, significance tests are designed to answer only the question of whether something 
matters.  They neither tell us how much something matters nor specify a plausible range of 
mattering.  Other ways of presenting data, like confidence intervals,12 error bars13 or the 
amount of variance a variable uniquely explains,14 address these latter concerns, but often all 
                                                 
12 A confidence interval may be thought of as indicating, with a specific probability, the range of values a variable 
may plausibly take in a population.  More precisely if one were to take a series of random samples from a population 
and compute a confidence interval of N% for each sample, N% of the sample confidence intervals would encompass 
the true population parameter.  Suppose, for example, we randomly sampled a group of starting large firm associates 
and asked men and women their salaries, finding that the men in our sample earned on average $4500 more than the 
women, and that the confidence interval at the 95% level ranged between $1100 and $7900.  This indicates that if 
we could know the salaries of all starting large firm associates there is a 95% chance that the calculated mean 
difference in the starting salaries of all male and female associates would be between $1100 and $7900.  
        If one is testing a null hypothesis (e.g. there is no difference in the starting salaries paid male and female large 
firm associates)  a confidence interval that does not encompass 0 is statistically significant at the level indicated by 1 
– N% where N% is the confidence level.  Thus in our starting salary example the $4500 difference that we found 
would be significant at the .05 level.  If the 95% confidence interval had spanned a range of possibilities from 
women earning $100 more than men to men earning $9100 more than women,  (-$100 - +$9100) the difference 
between the starting salaries of male and female associates  would not be significant at the .05 level.  Note, however, 
how much more informative the confidence level information is than a simple statement that the difference between 
the starting salaries of male and female associates is not statistically significant.  If all we have is the latter 
information, we leave the study thinking that male and female associates are paid more or less the same.   If we are 
given the confidence interval, we know that although there was no statistically significant difference between the 
starting salaries of male and female associates, more likely than not there is a difference, and it may well be so large 
that it is a matter of considerable concern.  Thus the same data may be presented so as to suggest that any 
discrimination between men and women in large firms does not involve starting salaries and we should focus our 
research on other areas, or to suggest that there is a potentially serious problem of starting salary discrimination that 
cries out for further investigation.  
13 Error bars are a graphical way of presenting much the same information found in confidence intervals.  Typically 
they extend one standard deviation above and below a sample mean, corresponding to the 95% confidence interval.  
If the error bars around the means for two samples overlap, then the difference between the means is not significant 
at the .05 level.  If the error bars do not overlap, then the difference is statistically significant.   
14 In regression equations independent variable are often correlated and it may be impossible to untangle the relative 
importance of correlated variables.  A stringent test of a variable’s importance, which has been called “usefulness,” 
(Darlington, Richard B. (1968). Multiple regression in psychological research and practice. Psychological Bulletin, 
71, 161-182.)  is how much a model’s explanatory power suffers if the variable is dropped from the model.  Suppose 
for example, that following up on the findings hypothesized in note 15 above, we decided to use regression analysis 
to ascertain the determinants of large firm associate starting salaries and, in particular, whether  associate gender had 
an important effect.  We might have constructed a model that included such variables as law school attended, rank in 
class, law review membership, firm size, firm location, clerkship experience, age, marital status,  firm billable hour 
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an author reports (I, like Ziliak and McCloskey, have been guilty of this) are tables of 
associations or point estimates with asterisks indicating whether certain “magical” 
significance levels (.1, .05, .01, .001) have been reached.   
 Although it is natural to conclude that a relationship significant at the .001 level is 
stronger and more important than one that is significant at the .05 or .1 level, this is simply 
not true.  One reason is that for any given strength of effect, the larger the N the higher the 
significance level.  With a large enough N virtually all associations in a sample will be 
statistically significant, for as size increases random effects are more likely to cancel out and 
even weak signals will emerge through the real world’s noise.   
 
Why Test for Significance? 
 The reader may have noted that I have gotten quite a way into this discussion without 
ever clearly saying what significance tests are good for.  Ziliak and McCloskey do likewise.  
They do not deny the importance of appropriately used significance tests, but they are not as 
clear as they might be in explaining what the appropriate uses are. This may be because their 
primary imagined audience is economists, who presumably need no instruction on this score.  
This book may, however, be profitably read by statistical novices.  The authors’ prose is 
                                                                                                                                                             
norms, practice area and gender.  With this information we could, no doubt, do quite well, in explaining starting 
salaries; let us assume our model explained 74% of the variance.  Then suppose we reran the model but did not 
include our gender variable.  If the model then explained 73% of the variance, the result would not necessarily 
exclude gender as an important cause of salary differences because other variables in the model might be proxying 
for it, but it would make the claim that gender was by itself not a very important factor  in determining starting 
associate salaries far more plausible, and it would suggest that the $4500 starting salary difference in our sample was 
not the result of lower offers being extended to women because they were women.   On the other hand, if 
eliminating gender from our model reduced the explained variance in starting salaries from 74% to 59%, the claim 
that women were paid less because of the types of jobs they chose or aspects of their resumes would be far less 
plausible, and the conclusion that large firms discriminated against women in setting their starting salaries would be 
substantially strengthened.  These differences might well not be obvious, and we would have little or no idea of their 
magnitude, if all we asked was whether the coefficient on the gender variable in our model was statistically 
significant.   
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clear (more about their “poetry” later) and no technical knowledge is needed to understand 
the book’s core points.  Thus, a word about why social scientists do significance testing is in 
order. 
 Social science investigates relationships between variables. Sometimes the aim is 
simply description, but the more usual goal is to infer cause, which is to say finding 
associations that make causal claims more credible.   To illustrate, imagine a study that seeks 
to determine whether preschool attendance affects the likelihood that children from 
disadvantaged backgrounds will stay in school through high school graduation and, if so, 
whether the gains are such as to make social investments in pre-schooling worthwhile.  
Suppose we were able to identify a group of disadvantaged students who participated in a 
well-designed pre-school program and a group without any pre-school experience and, 
following them through their educational careers, we found that 70% of the former graduated 
high school as compared to 40% of the latter.  This difference makes the claim that pre-
schooling has a positive effect on educational persistence appear more likely than it appeared 
before we examined the data.  
  Can we be completely confident that pre-schooling has such a large, positive effect?  
No.  Many rival hypotheses; that is, reasons for our findings that have nothing to do with the 
efficacy of pre-school, might explain the data. 15  Perhaps those parents most interested in 
their children’s education enrolled them in pre-school, and educational persistence reflects 
degrees of parental support rather than pre-schooling.  Or maybe only English speaking 
                                                 
15 My first published article, applying ideas from the writings of Donald T. Campbell and 
originally written for a seminar he taught, had to do with these issues.  See Richard Lempert, 
Strategies of Research Design in The Legal Impact Study: The Control of Plausible Rival 
Hypotheses, 1 Law & Society Review 111 (Fall, 1966) 
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families learned of the pre-school opportunity, and English language ability explains why 
some students were more successful through high school than others.  To strengthen our 
claim that pre-schooling is a key causal variable, we would want to rule out these and other 
rival hypotheses.16 
 One such rival hypothesis is “chance.”  It may be that neither pre-schooling nor 
parental support nor English language ability nor any other factor that might have 
systematically advantaged the pre-schooled group explains their greater success.  Instead, by 
sheer happenstance more members of the schooled than unschooled group may have 
succeeded.  By the luck of the draw students who had been pre-schooled may have been 
assigned to more capable teachers in kindergarten and first grade, or the pre-schooled girls as 
a group may have been no less sexually active than their unpre-schooled counterparts but 
more fortunate in escaping pregnancy.17  Significance tests assess the plausibility of the rival 
hypothesis “chance” and nothing more.  A significance level tells us the likelihood that we 
would find an association or difference between two variables as or more extreme than the 
one observed if the association or difference only existed by chance.18  As Ziliak and 
                                                 
16 For an outstanding, accessible treatment of the logic of social science inquiry see Arthur L. Stinchcombe, 
Constructing Social Theories, Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc. 1968 (Now available from the University of Chicago 
Press). 
17 Sometimes what appears to be random luck unrelated to the variable of interest is not.   For example, pre-schooled 
youth might have more capable first grade teachers because the better teachers try to arrange things so that their 
classes will contain a high proportion of children who have been pre-schooled, and it may be that pre-school has its 
effect only because it channels its students to the better first grade teachers and these teachers in turn prepare their 
charges to do better second grade work, etc.  Pre-school would still be a cause of the pre-schooled students’ later 
success, but the reason it leads to success (i.e., the mechanism by which it worked) would not be what most would 
suppose.  This matters.  If we knew the mechanism, we would not choose to invest more in pre-schooling but would 
instead spend our money to increase the quality of first grade teaching.  Mechanisms are often acknowledged to be 
unknown or are assumed to be the most obvious ones in the circumstances.  Understanding the mechanism by which 
independent variables have their effects can be as or more important than knowing whether an effect exists or how 
large it is.   
18 A different way of thinking about this is to imagine that we could do the same study time after time with repeated 
random samples from the same population.  If we would seldom get results like those observed in the original study 
in subsequent studies, then our conclusion that we had found a real relationship is suspect.  If we would often get 
11 
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McCloskey point out, the greater number of other plausible rival hypotheses that exist and 
the more plausible they are, the less one gains from being able to rule out chance as an 
explanation for data.  Nevertheless, the culture of social science calls for ruling out the 
chance explanation as a starting point for analysis.   
 Ruling out chance as an explanation is most valuable and most necessary when a 
study has been designed so that chance is the most plausible rival explanation.  This is the 
case with studies that use random assignment to treatments or surveys that randomly sample 
members of a population.  Suppose that to determine the effects of pre-school, we had first 
identified a large group of disadvantaged children and then randomly assigned some but not 
others to attend pre-schools.  If the number of students in each group was moderately large, it 
would be only by extremely bad luck that on average the pre-schooled group would turn out 
to have had parents who were more concerned with their children’s education than the 
parents of those in the unschooled group or that the pre-schooled children were better 
English speakers at the time assignments were made to treatment. 19  If the pre-schooled 
group did better at persisting to high school graduation than the group without pre-schooling, 
a significance test would tell us how likely it was that we had been unlucky; i.e., that chance 
factors might have resulted in a relationship between pre-schooling and high school 
graduation at least as strong as the one we observed.   
 Purists have argued that the only appropriate use of significance tests is when there 
has been random sampling or random assignment to treatments, but most social scientists 
                                                                                                                                                             
results like those we observed, then the association is unlikely to be accidental.  It could, of course, still exist for 
reasons other than the one we posit. 
19 In our imaginary experiment all those assigned to pre-schooling and only those assigned to pre-schooling would 
have a pre-school experience.  In real world experiments of this sort matters get more complex as some parents 
invited to send their children to pre-school do not and some parents whose children are not in the pre-school group 
find pre-schooling for their children on their own. Similar problems occur in many field experiments. 
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believe that significance tests are properly employed whenever “it happened by chance” is a 
plausible rival hypothesis20.  To illustrate, suppose we had not randomly assigned three and 
four year olds to pre-school, but instead had data on a group of 18 year olds, some but not all 
of whom had been pre-schooled.  If we found that students with pre-schooling were more 
likely to have graduated high school than those without pre-schooling, we would then have 
to decide whether the pre-school experience figured in the pre-schooled sample’s greater 
success.  This task would be more difficult than it is in the randomized experiment because 
there would be more plausible rival hypotheses for us to dispose of.21  
   To dispose of these hypotheses, we would most likely construct a regression model 
that included not just pre-school attendance but also other variables in our data set that might 
plausibly explain school persistence, such as parents’ education, birth order, or whether a 
student had made a sports team as a high school freshman.  If, after controlling for these and 
other plausible causal variables we found, that pre-school attendance remained associated 
with educational persistence (i.e., had a positive beta coefficient in our regression equation) 
we would have greater confidence that pre-schooling had the effects we posit.  Before 
proclaiming our greater confidence, however, we would want to be relatively certain that 
factors we could not control for (good or bad luck in getting pregnant after unprotected sex, 
for example) were not by chance associated with our pre-schooled sample in ways that might 
                                                 
20 For discussion of this issue see Denton E. Morrison and Ramon E. Henkel,  (1970) The Significance Test 
Controversy: A Reader Chicago: Aldine 
21 In either case it could be that the pre-schooled group contained children whose parents valued education more 
highly.  In the version of the study we are now discussing this possibility would have to be specifically addressed.  
In a fully randomized experiment, this hypothesis would be assimilated into the rival hypothesis that the association 
between pre-schooling and high school graduation exists by chance, for it would only be by chance that those 
students who enjoyed pre-schooling initially had parents who were more concerned with their children’s education 
than the parents of children in the control group.  Randomization is valuable because it converts many otherwise 
plausible rival hypotheses into the single rival hypothesis of chance, and the likelihood of this hypothesis can be 
addressed by significance tests. 
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explain their greater apparent success.  If the effect (beta coefficient) we found for pre-school 
attendance was statistically significant, meaning the coefficient differed from zero to a 
degree that was very unlikely if only chance mattered, we would have that assurance, or, 
more precisely, know the degree to which we might feel reassured.22 
 Typically significance tests measure deviation from a null (or no difference) 
hypothesis.23  This means that researchers are usually testing hypotheses they don’t believe 
and hope to dismiss.   In our example the researcher is most likely looking at pre-school 
attendance because she believes it increases later learning, but she is positing for testing 
purposes that pre-school attendance has no (or a null) effect on school persistence and that 
any apparent association between the two variables is plausibly attributable to chance.  If it 
turns out that significance tests justify rejection of the null hypothesis,24  the researcher will 
have increased confidence that pre-schooling promotes educational persistence -- and she 
will also find it easier to get her results published. 
The Dark Side of Significance Testing 
 Ziliak and McCloskey’s complaints about significance testing are complaints about 
how they are used.  Their primary complaint is that, although for most policy and theoretical 
purposes it is the strength of an association and not its existence that matters, often the only 
reported measures of association are significance tests which, without more, tell us nothing 
                                                 
22 The reader may correctly intuit that a far greater threat to our confidence in claiming that pre-schooling promotes 
school persistence comes from absent variables that are systematically rather than randomly associated with pre-
school attendance.  I’ll say a bit more about this below. 
23 Significance tests can also measure deviation from a value other than zero.  A researcher may hypothesize that a 
population parameter has a particular value and use significance tests to answer the question of whether sample 
deviations from that specified value exceed what might be plausibly attributed to chance. 
24 Rejecting a null hypothesis is, by the most common social science convention, justified if an association as strong 
or stronger than that which is observed would, on average, occur no more than five times in 100 repeated random 
samples of size n drawn from a population, or, as it is more commonly phrased, has a no greater than 5% probability 
of appearing by chance.  Depending on the issue as well as sample characteristics, the use of significance levels 
greater or less than .05 may, however, be justified. 
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about the likely importance of the association observed.  Thus, in our example a significant 
relationship might exist if pre-schooling raised the apparent probability of graduating high 
school from 40% to 80%, but if the sample were large enough a significant relationship 
might also exist if experiencing pre-school raised the probability of graduation from 40% to 
40.4%.25  In the former instance major societal investments in pre-schooling might well be 
justified.  But if the gain were only .4%, most would feel that if our goal was to increase 
educational persistence there would be far better uses for our money than funding pre-
schools.   Perhaps beguiled by the cult of significance, researchers too often simply tell us 
that a variable matters, and ignore the question of how much it matters (which Ziliak and 
McCloskey refer to as a variable’s oomph)..26  Ziliak and McCloskey’s response to studies 
that emphasize significance and ignore oomph is “Who cares?”  In their view neither the 
theorist nor policy maker should care about the “whether question” when it is separated from 
the question “How much?”. 
 Another of Ziliak and McCloskey’s complaints about significance tests is that they 
too often lead researchers and their readers to read too much into a study’s results.  Rejecting 
a null hypothesis is not the same as proving a favored one.  Indeed, disposing of the null 
hypothesis may have almost no effect on the likelihood a favored hypothesis is true.  In many 
studies the null hypothesis is only one of many rival hypotheses that might explain research 
results, and it is often not the most plausible competitor.  Consider the variant of our pre-
school study in which only retrospective assessment was possible.  Unless we could control 
                                                 
25 As Ziliak and McCloskey more than once point out and as I have already noted above, with large enough samples 
weak and unimportant relationships can be statistically significant. 
26 Ziliak and McCloskey also object to simple significance testing because it tells us nothing about the range of 
plausible effects.  Hence they advocate the routine presentation of confidence intervals.  See note 15, supra. 
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for the range of educationally relevant factors that might distinguish those children who had 
attended pre-schools from those who hadn’t, knowing that the better performance of those 
pre-schooled was unlikely to be attributable to chance would do almost nothing to make 
more plausible our hypothesis that the pre-school experience was a crucial cause, nor would 
it tell us how important the pre-school experience might be.   
 Where inadequately controlled potential confounds are known and obvious, as in the 
preceding example, there may be little danger that too much will be read into a finding of 
significance or, indeed, that the work will even see print,27 but where the need for or the 
inadequacy of controls is less obvious, studies are often published -- and occasionally 
become influential -- in part because researchers write as if disproving a null hypothesis 
means their favored hypothesis has been proven.28 
 Significance tests also do harm when they discourage authors from submitting work 
where the results are not statistically significant, or when they lead reviewers and editors to 
reject submissions because key results fall short of (conventionally defined) statistical 
significance.   For starters there is what has been called the file drawer problem.  If enough 
different researchers examine the same relationship in enough different samples, chances are 
that one researcher will draw a sample which suggests a significant association even if there 
is no relationship in the larger population, for by definition we can expect that one study in 
twenty will be significant at the .05 level when there is no relationship between the variables 
                                                 
27 This is not to say that such work is never published.  For example, until about 30 years ago the problem of sample 
selection bias was seldom recognized and even today there are often no adequate ways to account for it. 
28 I do not mean to suggest that studies that do not adequately control for all plausible rival hypotheses should not be 
published.  If this were the rule, almost no social science research would be done.  In the social sciences as in the 
other sciences knowledge generally accretes as studies build on each other and the strengths of one study 
compensate for the weaknesses of another.  All I, and I presume Ziliak and McCloskey, are objecting to are those 
who write as if disproving a null hypothesis establishes the truth of the hypothesis they offer. At best, and then 
usually only in the context of other research, disproving a null makes a favored hypothesis substantially more likely. 
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studied.  If the one study “with results” is published while the many studies that found no 
relationship rest unread in file drawers, consumers of the research will be misled by the 
published results.   
  An even greater threat to science-based understandings is the problem of low power.   
Particularly when samples are small, even strong relationships may not be statistically 
significant.  This may lead researchers to report finding no relationship in the data when a 
relationship not only exists, but is also substantively important.  Ziliak and McCloskey use 
data from a clinical trial of Vioxx as an example.29   An important paper assessing this trial 
indicated that during the trial there were 5 deaths from heart attacks in the Vioxx group 
compared to 1 death in the control condition.30  The sample size and the number of deaths 
were, however, such that the difference in heart attack deaths was too small to achieve 
statistical significance.  This led Merck, the manufacturer of Vioxx, to claim that there was 
no difference in the adverse cardiovascular effects associated with Vioxx and naproxen (e.g., 
Aleve) the drug taken by the control group.  But a 5 to 1 difference in deaths is a difference 
that might concern us if we were prescribed Vioxx, regardless of whether the difference 
reached the .05 level of significance.   
 In the case of Vioxx the numbers of deaths (or one version of them) were published 
for all to see.  But the cultural demand for significance means that many studies with low 
power will not be published, even some that suggest the possibility of reasonably strong 
relationships.  This is particularly unfortunate today because advances in meta-analytic 
                                                 
29 The Cult, Ch. 1. 
30 These are the figures given in the original report on the trial.  Later it turned out that 8 people in the Vioxx 
condition had died, but three cases had been dropped from the data for reasons that are not clear.  Ziliak and 
McCloskey suggest that this may have been done to get the number of Vioxx deaths below what was needed to 
make the fatality difference statistically significance.  Id at 29. 
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techniques allow researchers to aggregate studies and find relationships that do not emerge in 
studies taken individually.  If work is not published because results are not statistically 
significant, important information will often be unavailable for meta-analysis.  
  
 The Law Gets It (almost) Right 
 Although Ziliak and McCloskey refer in several places to the law as one of the fields 
affected by the problems that concern them, only once do they offer a legal example.  When 
they do, they go wrong in an interesting way.   
 The authors criticize the United States Supreme Court for embracing in Castenada v. 
Partida 31 significance criteria as grounds for a deciding whether a jury was chosen in a 
discriminatory manner.  But Castenada is that rare situation where a significance test may be 
appropriate grounds on which to rest a decision.32  This is because juries are supposed to be 
chosen at random from identifiable populations, and significance tests measure the likelihood 
that deviations from an expected distribution might have occurred by chance.33  Moreover, 
legal norms are violated by discrimination, however slight.34   If Castenada can be faulted, it 
is more for suggesting that conventional measures of statistical significance are, as a general 
matter,  appropriate measures of legal significance.35 
                                                 
31 430 U.S. 482 (1977) 
32 Ziliak and McCloskey seem confused about what the legal issue is.  Their language suggests that they view the 
relevant null hypothesis as the defendant’s innocence of a charged crime.   
33 For example, if black citizens constituted 20% of a county’s voting age population, we would expect that unbiased 
selection from that population would yield a venire that was about 20% black.  If only 10% of those called for jury 
duty were black, we would want to know how likely it was that random draws from the county’s population would 
produce a venire that had 10% or fewer blacks.  Significance tests could answer this question. 
34 The degree of violation may be relevant to harmless error analysis, but the first issue for a court to decide is 
whether a violation occurred. 
35 The Court may also be criticized for writing as if it didn’t matter whether a court required a significance level 
corresponding to a difference of two or three standard deviations before deciding that a null hypothesis should be 
rejected.  These levels differ in their stringency, with the former indicating a relationship significant at the .05 level 
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The Law Gets It (very) Wrong 
 Because Ziliak and McCloskey – with the exception of Castenada -- don’t examine 
the use of significance tests in legal cases, the legal literature or the law and social science 
literature, we need to ask whether the issues they identify should concern lawyers, legal 
academics and socio-legal scholars.  The answer, unsurprisingly, is “yes.”   
 It is easy to find in the legal and law-related literature anecdotal evidence of the 
problems and misunderstandings that concern Ziliak and McCloskey, sometimes in work that 
has had significant impact.  For example, Richard Sander, who holds both a Ph.D. in 
economics and a law degree, published an article in the Stanford Law Review in 2005 that 
purports to show that affirmative action harms black law students more than it helps them.36  
Results from this study have been highlighted in newspapers and blogs, discussed on NPR 
and presented to the United States Commission on Civil Rights.37  His article could, 
however, stand as a poster child for the issues Ziliak and McCloskey discuss.   Not only does 
Sander’s article rely largely on significance tests rather than measures of strength to carry its 
statistical argument forward, but, even worse, it explicitly instructs its readers, many of 
whom will be statistically naïve, that statistical significance indicates substantive 
significance: 
                                                                                                                                                             
and the latter a relationship significant at the .01 level.  However, when jury discrimination is the issue, if there has 
been intentional discrimination and samples are not small, differences between the expected and observed values of 
minority or female jury membership are likely to be greater than even three standard deviations. 
36 Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367 
(2004)   I have been a critic of Sander’s research methods and conclusions.  See e.g., David L. Chambers, Timothy 
T. Clydesdale, William C. Kidder, and Richard O. Lempert,  The Real Impact of Affirmative Action in American 
Law Schools: An Empirical Critique of Richard Sander’s Study, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1855 (2005) 
37 It is one of those rare studies that received prominent mention in the New York Times. Adam Liptak, For Blacks in 
Law School, Can Less be More?  New York Times, News of the Week in Review, February 13, 2005.  It was also 
the subject of a story in The Chronicle of Higher Education. Katherine S. Mangan, “Does Affirmative Action Hurt 
Black Law Students,” Nov. 12, 2004. 
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The “t-statistic” tells us how consistent or reliable a relationship is, with a higher t-
statistic indicating a stronger, more reliable association. T-statistics generally increase 
as a function of the standardized coefficient and the size of the sample. T-statistics 
above 2.0 are usually taken to signify that the independent variable is genuinely 
helpful in predicting the dependent variable. A t-statistic of less than 2.0 indicates a 
weak, inconsistent relationship—one that might well be due to random fluctuations in 
the data. (emphasis added)38 
 
  Thus Sander encourages his readers to draw conclusions that Ziliak and McCloskey, 
numerous econometricians, statisticians and others whose names they mention, and many 
whose names they do not mention, caution against.   These experts correctly advise that the 
fact that a significance test on an independent variable exceeds the .05 level39 tells us nothing 
about whether that variable is “genuinely helpful” in predicting a dependent variable,40 nor 
does an insignificant t-statistic necessarily indicate a “weak, inconsistent relationship.” 
 To move from the level of anecdote and gain a more general picture of how 
problematic Ziliak and McCloskey’s concerns are in the context of socio-legal scholarship 
and legal decision making, I examined small samples of judicial decisions and socio-legal 
articles that featured quantitative data.  I identified relevant decisions by searching the 
Westlaw federal courts data base using the terms “statistical significance” or “statistically 
significant” or “.05 level” or “.01 level.”  To identify articles I examined 14 articles in the 
Harvard Law Review retrieved through Westlaw by searching with the term “statistical 
                                                 
38 Id at 428-29.  The Stanford Law Review is a student edited rather than a peer reviewed journal.  One would like to 
think that a misstatement like this would not pass the screen of peer review. 
39 A t statistics of 2 (1.96 precisely) is significant at the .05 level. 
40 Professor Sander inadvertently illustrates this point in a logistic regression of 21,425 cases whose implications he 
calls “profound.” In this regression, which aims at predicting whether a law student will pass the bar,  law school 
GPA, LSAT score, law school tier and undergraduate GPA are all significant beyond .0001, and being male is 
significant beyond .01.  Moreover, the equation as a whole improves our ability to predict who will pass the bar to a 
statistically significant degree (beyond .001). This sounds good, but 95% of the law students in this sample pass the 
bar.  If in each case we predicted the student would pass the bar, we would be right 95% of the time.  If we used 
Sander’s model to refine our prediction, we would be right in an additional 29 of the 21,425 cases or 95.1% of the 
time.  In short, we have highly significant results, but what they tell us is of virtually no use, and the implications of 
the regression are hardly profound.  Sander, supra note 28 at 444-45. 
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significance,” I similarly identified and examined about ten additional articles retrieved from 
Hein on Line, and I skimmed all the quantitative articles in two issues each of the Law and 
Society Review and the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies that I happened to have at hand.  
 I do not want to oversell this effort.  It is impressionistic and casual rather than 
systematic and scientific. I did not attempt to apply the Ziliak and McCloskey scorecard to 
the writing I examined, but focused only on their core concerns; namely, whether 
significance tests were inappropriately relied on and whether information about the strength 
and importance of associations and differences was presented and appropriately used.   
 Courts, it appears, too often focus only on statistical significance, perhaps because 
this is what expert witnesses emphasize in their reports and testimony.  I had originally 
intended to examine 25 recent decisions, but after looking at the first ten I retrieved and 
finding only 2 that paid any attention to the impact of findings or the weight they deserved in 
deciding the dispute, I decided it would be a waste of time to continue the investigation.   Not 
only did courts in the cases I looked at seldom refer to more than statistical significance in 
discussing studies offered in evidence, but they often did so in ways that indicated little 
understanding of statistical concepts.   
 For example, in a case arising from an allegation that a drug company, 
GlaxoSmithKline, had committed securities fraud by failing to disclose adverse drug trial 
results, a panel of the Second Circuit wrote: 
We have held that reports of harmful drug effects are immaterial - and thus need not 
be disclosed - unless those reports … show statistically significant evidence of an 
adverse effect… The complaint does not explain how the results of the research trials 
at issue could be deemed statistically significant in light of the test results from 
another trial that GSK did disclose.41 
                                                 
41 Masters v. GlaxoSmithKline, Slip Copy, 2008 WL 833085, C.A.2,2008. March 26, 2008 
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 If the panel is using the word “immaterial” in its legal sense, this language tells us 
that studies that don’t meet its significance criterion are completely unrelated to any fact in 
issue in the litigation. This is the same as saying that a study showing a drug to be more 
harmful than an alternative or placebo has no bearing on the drug’s likely safety so long as 
the study did not find the difference in ill effects to be statistically significant.  Then, since 
statistically insignificant results do not, in the court’s view, convey any information about a 
drug’s likely safety, the court concludes that disclosing the results of the study in this case 
would not have affected the price of a company’s stock.  The court is wrong on both counts.  
After receipt of the adverse trial results, confidence in the safety of the drug in question 
should diminish, and if the drug were important enough to GSK’s balance sheet, the price of 
its stock should decline. 
 Moreover, the court fails to perceive how the results of one study might affect the 
evaluation of another.  From the court’s language it seems likely that GSK conducted two 
studies of its drug’s safety, both with small N’s and thus low power, each of which yielded 
statistically insignificant results.  Taken together, however, in a mini meta-analysis, the 
evidence of adverse effects may have been, as the court’s allusion to the complaint suggests, 
statistically significant.  The court’s language dismissing the claim suggests that the 
plaintiff’s attorney did not explain why this might happen and that no judge was able to grasp 
the matter on his own.   
 In other cases “statistical significance” appears to be used more as an incantation than 
as a meaningful description of testimony or evidence.  Consider a ruling by a panel of the 
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10th Circuit, overturning a District Judge’s decision to exclude expert evidence in an insider 
trading case: 
Professor Fischel's testimony was to include a discussion of the economic incentives 
that inside information would have given Mr. Nacchio, the statistical significance of 
the differences in his trading patterns, and the likelihood that economic diversification 
better explained the challenged sales than inside information.42 
 
What is the statistical significance of the differences in trading patterns?  I have no idea; nor, 
I think, does the court.43 
 A panel of the 9th Circuit exhibits, if anything, even greater confusion in reviewing a 
lower court’s decision to admit 120 statements relating discrimination experienced by Wal-
Mart employees: 
 
Wal-Mart contends that the district court erred because the 120 declarations cannot 
sufficiently represent a class of 1.5 million. However, we find no authority requiring 
or even suggesting that a plaintiff class submit a statistically significant number of 
declarations for such evidence to have any value.44 
 
I expect the panel was correct in rejecting Wal-Mart’s claim of error, but it is meaningless to 
talk about receiving a statistically significant number of declarations.  Although the 
likelihood of obtaining statistical significance is affected by sample size, the two should not 
be confused, and there is no such thing as a statistically significant sample size.45 The court 
seems unaware of this. 
                                                 
42 U.S. v. Nacchio, 519 F.3d 1140, 1155, C.A.10 (Colo.),2008.  
 
43 Since Fischel’s methods were apparently never described, the court seems not to have had any particular 
comparison condition implicitly in mind.  Thus its language reminds me of the old joke, “What’s the difference 
between a duck?”  Answer: “One leg is both the same.”   
44 Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 509 F.3d 1168, 1182, C.A.9 (Cal.) ,2007.  
45 Since the declarations were unanalyzed volunteered complaints rather than any sort of researcher acquired sample, 
the language of statistical significance would be inappropriate even if there were thousands of declarations.  Perhaps 
the misuse of “statistically significant” in this case and the misuse of “statistical significance” in Nacchio reflects 
judicial adoption of language used by the lawyers arguing to them.  If so, the original misunderstanding may have 
been an attorney’s, perhaps as a rhetorical flourish.  Regardless, neither the Wal-Mart nor Nacchio panel had a 
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 Having found three such statements in the first ten cases I looked at, I hope the reader 
will understand why I did not continue looking until I reached my target sample.  After ten 
cases I had read enough to conclude that the law could only benefit if Ziliak and 
McCloskey’s book were required reading for judges.     
 
Scholars Do Better 
 Turning to socio-legal scholarship, a different picture emerged from my informal 
study.  There were, to be sure, some articles whose authors would qualify for membership in 
Ziliak and McCloskey’s cult of significance, and if I encountered a few such articles in the 
small group of articles I examined, there must be many more in the larger literature.  What 
struck me most, however, was the degree to which articles reflected the caution that concerns 
us and focused on the magnitude and potential importance of effects.  Articles frequently 
presented their raw data in detail, and when significance levels were noted, they were often 
accompanied in the text by attention to how much different variables mattered.   Indeed the 
lawyer or legal academic who reads widely in the empirical law and social science literature 
is likely to encounter enough good examples that the difference between statistical and 
substantive significance might be unconsciously absorbed.   
 Ian Ayres, in a study of discrimination in the prices offered car buyers, is exemplary.  
He instructs his readers that they should “focus … not merely on statistical significance but 
also on the amount of the reported discrimination.”46  And, in case this isn’t clear enough, he 
                                                                                                                                                             
member who understood the concept of statistical significance well enough to know when a reference did not make 
sense.  
46 Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations,  
104 Harv. L. Rev. 817 (1990-1991) 
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points out in a footnote that in a large enough sample differences in prices offered of only 
$5.00 might be statistically significant.  Perhaps because socio-legal scholars often write with 
an eye to the policy audience, many of them take care to follow their identification of 
significant variables with estimates of the importance of the variable’s effects.47 
Preponderance of the Evidence 
 Since Ziliak and McCloskey direct little attention to the law, they ignore an 
interesting problem.   By the conventions of statistical significance, a scientist should not 
claim to have identified a true effect unless the effect is not likely to have arisen by chance.48  
In civil actions, however, a court is supposed to decide the matter before it by “a 
preponderance of the evidence,” which is usually taken to mean that a plaintiff should prevail 
whenever the probability that her claim is justified exceeds 50%.  How do we reconcile this 
burden of proof with the tendency of courts in civil cases to ignore, or even refuse to admit, 
study results that are not significant at the .05 level?  Results need not be significant at the 
.05 or even the .1 level to make a plaintiff’s claim appear more likely true than seemed to be 
the case before the statistical evidence was known.49   
                                                 
47 Jodi L. Short and Michael W. Toffel, in an article looking at what leads firms to voluntarily disclose their 
environmental violations typify the attention to importance I found in a number of articles.  They write: The 
statistically significant positive coefficients on inspections and enforcement actions support our hypothesis that 
specific deterrence measures encourage self-disclosure. The results suggest that an additional RCRA inspection 
increases the probability of self-disclosure the next year by 14% (p = 0.020) and that an additional CAA inspection 
increases this probability by 11% (p = 0.053). Being subject to at least one enforcement action—a much rarer 
event—had a much greater influence on disclosure, as our results suggest that this more than doubles the likelihood 
of self-disclosing the next year compared to the probability evaluated at the means of all variables (p < 0.001), 
Coerced Confessions: Self-policing in the Shadow of the Regulator, Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 
May, 2008   
48 Depending on the field and the topic, the conventional minimum probability is usually one time in ten or one time 
in twenty, with some arguing that these probabilities can be doubled if there is a strong prior hypothesis of 
directionality 
49 Law-trained readers will recognize that the last part of this sentence fits well with FRE 401”s definition of 
relevant evidence and will know that relevant evidence is admissible unless excluded by some other rule or 
principle. 
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 To make the issue concrete, suppose a plaintiff attributes his kidney problems to a 
drug he took, and in a suit against the drug’s manufacturer offers a study that shows that 
patients in a randomized clinical trial who took the drug were three times more likely to be 
later diagnosed with kidney ailments than patients in the placebo condition.  Suppose also 
that the study had a relatively small number of participants and the 300% difference in the 
incidence of kidney ailments was significant at only the .2 level.  Following dominant 
conventions, we would not call the difference in the incidence of kidney problems in the two 
conditions statistically significant.  Noting the lack of statistical significance, many courts 
would refuse to admit the study’s results, or, if they were admitted, would ignore them in a 
bench trial or on a motion for a directed verdict.  Can excluding or ignoring findings 
consistent with the plaintiff’s position but lacking statistical significance be justified when a 
plaintiff need only prove her claim by a preponderance of the evidence? 
 One argument supporting exclusion is that an inexpert court should not second guess 
an expert regulatory agency that judged the scientific evidence insufficient to show a link 
between kidney disease and the drug in question.    This, however, is to ignore the evidence 
rather than evaluate it.   
 A second argument, suggested to me by the eminent biostatistician Paul Meier, is that 
if data indeed reflect a causal relationship, demanding significance at the .05 level is not a 
serious hurdle.50  A court might put the point this way: 
  “There are many causes of kidney disease.  Even if the plaintiff could show 
that we had considerable reason to be confident that the drug he took could cause 
kidney problems, he would still have difficulty showing the drug caused his kidney 
problems.  If he can’t even show that there is enough evidence to persuade scientists 
that the drug he took can cause kidney problems, I am not going to treat the study he 
                                                 
50 Meier made this argument to me about twenty-five years ago, commenting on an article I had sent him.  
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cites as evidence that the drug may have caused his kidney problems.  If the plaintiff 
were right and the drug in fact caused kidney problems, I am confident the data would 
have made this abundantly clear.” 
 
 As a practical matter, the judge will most often be right in his or her judgment, just as 
Meier’s observation is most often correct, particularly in the case of the large scale 
randomized clinical trials which he long advocated and for which he is best known.  But as a 
statistical matter there are problems here.  As Ziliak and McCloskey point out, many real 
world studies, including some in the biomedical world, have low power,51 so there is a good 
chance that real relationships will not pass the screen of conventional statistical significance.  
More importantly out hypothetical judge is using significance tests in exactly the wrong way, 
as indicators of the weight of evidence. Not only might the judge exclude evidence that 
would not pale into insignificance next to other potential causes of the plaintiff’s kidney 
problems, but a judge who responds reflexively to the conventions of statistical significance 
is vulnerable to a greater danger.    Had the link between the drug and kidney problems been 
statistically significant, the judge (or jury) might have accorded the study results far too 
much weight given other evidence in the case and the many possible causes of kidney 
problems. 
 
Concerns Beyond Statistical Significance 
 Ziliak and McCloskey mention but do not describe in detail statistical approaches that 
researchers might adopt to aid judges in deciding whether to admit evidence and how to 
value it; these sometimes implicit and sometimes explicit suggestions are beyond to scope of 
                                                 
51 This may either be because of small sample size or because they are searching for weak but important effects, 
such as small increases in risk, which despite their small size can lead to many excess deaths when spread across a 
large population. 
27 
 
25
Lempert:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2008
this essay.52   I do, however, want to elaborate on one point Ziliak and McCloskey mention 
but do not develop.   The authors remind us at several places that a study’s results may be 
suspect for many reasons apart from a lack of statistical significance.  Indeed, one of their 
take-away messages is that we should not rely on a study’s results simply because they attain 
some high level of statistical significance. 
 Recall what significance tests do.  They deal with just one of the rival hypotheses that 
might explain a result, and except in studies involving randomized designs or random 
sampling, they do not usually address the most plausible of those rival hypotheses.  Indeed, 
even where there has been randomization, other concerns may mean that reported results are 
not what they seem.  We should thus add to “chance” other common plausible rival 
hypotheses that the reader of any quantitative -- and much qualitative -- empirical research 
should be alert to, especially when research results are offered as reasons for action.  
 
 A variable does not have the meaning the author gives it.  IQ for example, is 
not intelligence.  It is a score on a test that imperfectly measures aspects of a broader 
concept, intelligence.   Similarly, crimes reported to the police do not necessarily 
reflect the incidence of crime in an area.  Apparent sharp changes in crime rates may 
be traceable to changes in how the police record complaints or efforts to get victims 
to report crimes.  Variables may also not bear the meanings attributed to them 
because of coding conventions or coding errors.  Readers of empirical work should 
                                                 
52 For example, they make clear their sympathy with Bayesian approaches to the evaluation of evidence and the need 
to take a cost-benefit perspective when deciding how much to credit evidence. 
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always look behind the language in which results are presented for information about 
how a concept has been operationalized, which is to say instantiated in the data. 
 
 Sample biases favor a particular hypothesis.  In our hypothesized pre-school 
study for example, results showing a strong effect of pre-schooling on high school 
graduation would be suspect if the only students pre-schooled were those whose 
parents had chosen to enroll them.  Wherever subjects are selected for study, whether 
by the researcher, third parties, self-selection or by a process (e.g. only those whom 
the police arrest can be allowed or denied bail), readers should always ask whether 
the selection mechanism might potentially bias results one way or another and, if so, 
whether the biases have been controlled statistically or otherwise taken account of. 
 
 Crucial variables are omitted from the model.  A study of racial discrimination 
in the administration of the death penalty would most likely conclude that race had no 
effect if it considered only the likelihood that blacks and whites who committed 
crimes of similar heinousness would receive the death penalty.  But if the model also 
included information on the victim’s race and the victim-defendant racial pairings, 
race would appear to play a substantial role in determining who is chosen to die.53  
Readers should look carefully at variables that are neither included nor proxied for in 
a study and ask whether their inclusion might plausibly have changed the study’s 
results. 
                                                 
53 David Baldus, George Woodworth and Charles Pulaski, Equal Justice and the Death Penalty: A Legal and 
Empirical Analysis, Northeastern University Press (1990); Sam Gross and Robert Mauro, Death and 
Discrimination: Racial Disparities in Capital Sentencing, Northeastern University Press, 1989. 
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  The model has the wrong functional form or is unduly influenced by outliers.  
For example, a model may posit a linear relationship between variables when the 
relationship is curvilinear.  This can result in a poor fit between model and data even 
though the model’s independent variables are major determinants of the dependant 
variable when the relationship between the two is properly understood.  Thus, a linear 
model associating income with age may find little relationship if a study follows 
people to age 90 because past a certain age incomes diminish, but it would be a 
mistake to conclude from the poor fit that income and age are unrelated. A model 
which showed income flat through about age 16, then rising with age through some 
age in the 60s and then falling off would portray the income-age relationship more 
accurately.  Alternatively a model may fit misleadingly well, as when a few extreme 
cases have undue influence.  Thus Isaac Ehrlich in a well known study claimed to 
have shown that over a period of several decades each execution deterred 8 
homicides.  But this result depended entirely on Ehrlich’s decision to extend his time 
series into the 1960s when homicides were rising and executions had mostly 
stopped.54  Richard Berk has similarly shown that in more recent research suggesting 
executions deter homicides, the association seems due entirely to the inclusion of a 
few outlying states, most notably Texas.55  Readers should consider the 
reasonableness of the assumptions built into models for the problem at hand and the 
                                                 
54 Richard Lempert, Desert and Deterrence: An Assessment of the Moral Bases of the Case for Capital Punishment, 
79 MICH. L. REV. 1177 (1981) 
55 Richard Berk (2005) New Claims about Executions and General Deterrence: Déjà Vu All Over Again?  
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 2 (2) , 303–330 
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degree to which results are sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of particular 
variables or different ways of measuring them. (e.g., Models including income often 
fit better when income is given not in actual dollars but by the log of the dollar 
amount.   This dampens what would otherwise be the undue influence of a few cases 
with very large incomes.)  Also, rather than looking just at summary statistics, readers 
should consider which cases a model predicts well and which it predicts poorly. 
 
 
 Rival hypotheses like those above often pose more severe threats to the conclusions 
an author asserts than the possibility that an asserted relationship exists by chance, but they 
often receive less attention than the chance hypothesis because without easy to perform tests, 
like significance tests, the degree to which other rival hypotheses are of concern is harder to 
nail down.56 
                                                 
56 In many instances perceiving concerns like those I mention requires no technical statistical knowledge, although 
they may be obvious only to those who have considerable substantive knowledge of the area investigated.   If, 
however, it is a mistake to ignore rival hypotheses like these, it is also easy to make too much of them.  Only rival 
hypotheses that seem plausible are a serious concern, and the fact that a potential confound or other problem exists 
in a study does not mean the study’s results are necessarily invalid.  It is only a slight stretch, if it is a stretch at all, 
to say that no study will control for all plausible rival hypotheses, much less implausible ones.  Yet lawyers 
motivated to attack research often try to convince a judge or jury that this is the case.   For example, in a gender 
discrimination case brought against a university, a lawyer for the defendant might argue that a plaintiff’s model is 
flawed because it measures productivity by the number of articles produced rather than by the selectivity of the 
journals in which they were published.  This is a valid criticism since university salary setting is supposed to reflect 
not just the amount of scholarship produced but also its quality, and publication in selective peer-reviewed journals 
is regarded as a good proxy for article quality.  Nevertheless, results from a model that measures scholarship without 
attending to peer review are not necessarily invalid, nor should they be inadmissible.  Unless we know that the 
plaintiff had good data on publication quality and for no good statistical reasons chose not to use it in the model, 
there is no basis for assuming that had the data been included the model’s finding of discrimination would vanish.  If 
the defendant university thought the variable was important, it could have replicated the plaintiff’s model, adding 
the publication quality variable.  The same is true of other criticisms, like criticisms going to functional form, which 
could be tested if a party thought they really mattered but are instead often used only to suggest that the opposing 
party’s evidence cannot be trusted.  A similar point can be made about tendencies to criticize research for not 
controlling for factors that could not be controlled because of lack of data.  The fact finder can consider the likely 
implications of being unable to control for plausible relevant variables but should not assume that controlling for 
them would have changed anything.  Research can proceed only with the data that is available or which can be 
gathered at a reasonable cost relative to the knowledge or legal stakes.  Courts that do not hesitate to credit a party’s 
case even though a crucial witness has died or is otherwise unavailable, should not reject research results simply 
because information on a variable they would like to see included in a model cannot be acquired.   If the data are 
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 Virtues, Shortcomings and Peculiarities  
 The Cult of Statistical Significance has virtues that extend beyond its core message.  It 
is clearly written and should be accessible to those who have neither formal training in 
statistics nor a desire to secure any.  It is full of examples that illustrate why it is the strength 
of relationships and not their statistical significance that mainly matters.  It mentions various 
ways that researchers can convey information about the substantive significance of what they 
have found.  It highlights the need to view claims of no statistical significance in light of the 
power of the statistical tests employed.  And, in a portion of the book I have not commented 
on except in a footnote, it paints fascinating portraits of many of the founders of modern 
statistics and their intellectual and personal relationships.   
 The book also has some shortcomings and peculiarities.  For authors who rightly fault 
significance tests for the rigid, insensitive cutoff conventions they establish, Ziliak and 
McCloskey are surprisingly rigid in the standards they impose when evaluating the work of 
others.  Reading their studies and critiques, one would think that the state of empirical 
economics and the other empirical social sciences is far worse than it actually is.  Some 
might also be reluctant to credit any clinical trial that suggests a drug is no more dangerous 
than placebo unless the actual proportion of adverse incidents in the trial is the same for both 
conditions or favors the drug .  A person might also mistakenly think that there was nothing 
substantive to be learned from articles that are more attentive to statistical significance and 
less attentive to impact than the authors would like.   Yet often attention to the size of 
                                                                                                                                                             
available and are not included in a model, then there is the question of whether a spoliation inference is justified.  
But the better solution is to redo the model with the omitted data.  
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unstandardized coefficients, to the relative size of standardized ones, to explained variance 
and to the differential explanatory power of different models will allow moderately 
sophisticated readers to extract from articles information about importance that significance 
levels alone do not give, even if an article’s authors do not emphasize all that can be learned.   
 Turning to peculiarities, one which helps make the story interesting is the authors’ 
frequent attempts to characterize their endeavor as a struggle between the inheritors of the 
statistical philosophy of the good William Gosset (the “Student” of Student’s t test) and the 
heirs to the statistical philosophy of the malevolent Ronald Fisher.  In this they are, despite a 
few appropriate caveats, probably less kind to Fisher than Gosset would have been, for the 
book also discloses that Gosset admired Fisher as a mathematician and considered him a 
friend. 
  I could have done without another peculiarity.  The authors feel compelled at times to 
wax poetic, and at various places they summarize an observation in what they consider a 
haiku.   For example, their summary view of Fisher is, 
   Here’s a scientist 
   Who sank the world with a t 
   5 percent per cup.57 
 
It’s hard to say whether the pun or the poetry is worse.  Just as a significance level of .05 
doesn’t mean a relationship matters, so encapsulating a thought in 17 syllables in a 5-7-5 
syllable per line arrangement does not a lovely Japanese haiku make.  Doubters are referred 
to my subtitle. 
 
Curing the Problem 
                                                 
57 The Cult p.226 
33 
 
31
Lempert:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2008
 In a short final chapter, Ziliak and McCloskey address the question of how to cure the 
core problem they have identified.  Part of their prescription is an exhortation to scientists to 
pay better attention to the message that runs throughout the book – in doing research and 
writing up results scientists should seek to understand what is important.  At best, they tell 
us, significance levels make only a limited contribution to this determination, and they 
should certainly not be the sole focus of attention.  To persuade the world of this truth, the 
authors call on Nobel Prize winners and other prominent econometricians to take up their 
cause and reiterate their message.  They also encourage scientific gatekeepers, particularly 
journal editors, to insist that articles attend to the size and impact of effects using measures 
more revealing than tests of significance.  They conclude by referencing the man who is the 
hero of their story, telling their readers to “repent” and urging them to “Embrace your inner 
Gosset.”58   
 I would second both their advice and their desires, but my prescription for reform 
begins elsewhere.  It is cognitively too easy to confuse statistical significance with actual 
(substantive) significance.  This problem is a bad enough as it affects journal editors, 
reviewers and scientists.  It is worse when students are reading studies that emphasize 
statistical significance over effect sizes.  And correcting misunderstanding can be nearly 
impossible when statistically untrained people, including most judges and lawyers, are 
seeking to understand the implications of empirical research.   This last is particularly 
unfortunate as statistically untrained politicians, judges and their ilk are most often in a 
position where they can or must act on their understanding of what research has to say.   
                                                 
58 Id, at 251 The combination of revivalist and new age vernacular is striking.  With tongue only slightly in cheek, I 
would put their bottom line thusly: We should all be new age social scientists and go back for the future. 
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 Articles do not by themselves affect lives, no matter how much oomph exists in a 
model.  Research affects lives only when people act on it.  If those with power to act, 
whether by deciding a case, enacting a law or prescribing a medicine, cannot distinguish 
what actually matters from the likelihood that an association might exist by chance, actors 
with oomph may push in the wrong direction or refrain from pushing when it counts.  Hence 
my prescription for reform begins with eliminating the term “statistical significance” -- or at 
least the “significance” part of it -- from our vocabulary.  Other words with both technical 
and common sense connotations, like reliability, should be similarly avoided.  We might, for 
example, rename “significance levels” “random possibility indexes” and refer to significant 
associations (or differences) as “non-chance associations (or differences).”  But I have no 
brief for a particular term so long as some term or acronym unlikely to be confused with 
importance is used.  Thus I suggest, in all seriousness, that the Committee on National 
Statistics of the National Research Council (the National Academy of Science’s research 
arm) meet to settle on a term to replace statistical significance.  With the Committee 
Members’ personal prestige and the prestige of the National Academy behind them, perhaps 
a long overdue linguistic change might occur. 
 
Why a Book? 
 This essay is almost at its end.  All that remains is to answer the question my opening 
stanza poses: why a book?  Do we need The Cult of Statistical Significance?  We certainly 
shouldn’t.  As the authors acknowledge, their message is almost a century old, and it is not 
difficult to understand.   Moreover, except for best sellers, a category into which few 
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academics works (surely not including this one) fall, more people read articles than books, 
and teachers seldom assign books rather than shorter works that make the same points.  
  Still I welcome the book’s publication.  It is well written and interesting.  It collects 
far more information and arguments between its covers than any article could.  Its 
publication could trigger a beneficent burst of attention in a variety of disciplines to the 
proper use of significance tests and the need to present measures that focus specifically on 
importance.  Perhaps it will even give courage to editors who wish to deemphasize the role 
significance testing plays in deciding whether results are worth publishing or to reviewers 
who might otherwise hesitate to insist on revisions that make measures of impact front and 
center.  So there are good reasons for this book; reasons that will increase with every lawyer, 
judge and law student who reads it.  Legal academics too should not be left off this list.  
Those who do or read empirical research, which now includes most of us, can only benefit 
from taking to heart the lessons Ziliak and McCloskey teach. 
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